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Abstract 
This paper studies the effect of political variables on the gains obtained by Spanish 
regions in periodical bargaining of the intergovernmental financing agreements and on 
the regional distribution of discretional earmarked grants over the period 1987-2008. 
First, we find that the relationship between gains in transferred revenues and on 
regional public debt stocks depends on the period and the specific issues discussed in 
the corresponding negotiation, aside from political affinity. Second, we show that the 
most discretional program of earmarked grants is strongly driven by electoral strategy. 
National incumbents tend to allocate intergovernmental transfers where there are 
competitive regional elections. We also show that earmarked grants are allocated in 
those regions where the incumbent performs better in national elections and, especially, 
in those where there are more seats to be won. Hence we prove that both strategies are 
complementary rather than exclusive. 
 
 
Key words: Intergovernmental grants, party systems, elections, subcentral public debt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDMENTS 
We are grateful to Ignacio Lago for his insightful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. The research 
was financially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation [Grant code: ECO2010- 
15553]. 
 
 
 
Corresponding author: Santiago Lago-Peñas. E-mail: slagop@uvigo.es Web page: http://webs.uvigo.es/slagop 
 
 
 
2
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A growing body of literature argues that intergovernmental grants in fiscal 
federalism tend to be allocated according to political interests (Khemani, 2007: 465). 
Public agents face significant incentives in order to use public investment strategically. 
Nevertheless, the disagreement relies on the implemented strategy. A first set of authors 
have argued that in districted electoral systems, intergovernmental grants will be 
allocated in those regions in which there are more seats apportioned (Gibson et al., 
1999; Porto and Sanguinetti, 2001; Samuels and Snyder, 2001; Rodden, 2002; Hoover 
and Pecorino, 2005; Pitlik at al., 2006). Other authors have posited that 
intergovernmental grants will be allocated exclusively depending on the presence of the 
same party in charge of the subnational unit (Khemani, 2003, 2007). Finally, another 
strand of literature has focused on electoral races as the central element driving the 
levels of government investment, whether it is centered on their own strongholds (Cox 
and McCubbins, 1986) or in breaking a tie in a constituency (Lindbeck and Weibull, 
1993; Dixit and Londregan, 1996, 1998; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002). 
 
Previous studies have been especially focused on the incentives encouraging 
different strategies. However, there are still important efforts to be made in two 
analytical vectors. First, political strategies dealing with intergovernmental grants 
require the interaction of electoral outcomes and institutional context (León-Alfonso, 
2007) to be considered together. Second, the subnational level of competition has 
received less attention in comparison to the national one. The focus has been 
particularly centered on political affinity among levels of government (Khemani, 2003; 
2007) but the role played by regional elections has not been directly addressed. This 
paper fills that gap. 
 
Spain provides a perfect case study to deal with these challenges. First, it is an 
evolving federation characterized up to now by periodical bargaining on its fiscal 
federal framework. The main issue discussed at all times is the amount of total revenues 
for regions and the criteria to distribute it among those regions. By and large, the main 
sources of revenues for regional governments are grants (both unconditional and 
conditional) and tax sharings. Second, Spain is a country with substantial variance in 
district magnitude across constituencies in national elections (Monroe and Rose, 2002), 
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so it presents a significant within-country change in incentives for resource allocation. 
Finally, the case of Spain is puzzling. Despite the theoretical expectations political 
variables have not been proven especially relevant in some pieces of research (Lago-
Peñas, 2005; Gómez-Reino y Herrero, 2011) or, at best, there has been mixed evidence 
in others (Jarocinska, 2006; León-Alfonso, 2007). 
 
The main contribution of this paper is to integrate the different explanations of 
intergovernmental transfers in the case of Spain. We focus on two different elements 
determining resource allocation done by national incumbents: increases of revenues for 
Autonomous Communities (ACs) or regions as a consequence of periodical bargaining 
on its financing system, and the most discretional program of earmarked grants: 
investment agreements made by the central government with subnational entities1. In 
this paper we show that no political variables affect the relative regional gains in the 
different bargaining process that have taken place. Only in the fourth system regional 
reform in 2009 was public debt stock positively correlated with the gains in the 
financing system despite the previous correlation being negative. Hence we show that 
the mechanism linking debt with higher transfers does not operate automatically and 
universally.  
 
We also show that in the case of Spain the program of earmarked grants is 
driven by the electoral interests of the national incumbent, but the preferred strategy is 
different depending on incentives provided by each level of competition. On the one 
hand, earmarked grants tend to be allocated in regions where there is a narrow margin of 
victory in regional elections, back-warding the idea of tactical investment centered on 
swing regions (Lindbeck and Weibull,1993; Dixit and Londregan, 1996). On the other 
hand, incumbents tend to devote resources to those regions where they have better 
results at the national level, especially in those with more seats allocated. Therefore, 
they follow a “take care of your own” strategy when they focus on the national level 
(Cox and McCubbins, 1986; León-Alfonso, 2007). Then, both strategies are followed 
simultaneously by a political center interested in maximizing its chances of reelection in 
the national arena and securing as many subnational governments as possible. 
 
                                                            
1 “Convenios de inversion” in Spanish. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, the literature on the 
political use of intergovernmental transfers and public investment is surveyed. The main 
hypothesis that has been presented by the literature is discussed and connected with the 
Spanish case. In section 3 we present the variables used, the specifications and the 
econometric methodology. The next section summarizes the empirical results and 
discusses their substantive implications. Section 5 concludes the study.  
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A growing body of political economy literature has been centered on how 
incumbents use intergovernmental transfers for strategic purposes. The central idea of 
this approach is that political parties and candidates use redistributive policies as an 
instrument in order to maximize their electoral results, aside from other normative or 
efficiency considerations. This argument involves two assumptions. First, it assumes 
that politicians are mainly self-interested rent-seekers and they principally care about 
(re)-election. Second, it assumes that voters are mainly interested in the private 
consumption derived from public policies investment.2 Based on those premises, the 
literature has investigated the political determinants driving this strategic use of 
transfers. 
The first element that has been addressed is the (un)equal territorial distribution 
of political representation. According to this argument, Samuels and Snyder (2001) 
pointed out that policy agenda can be shaped by the level of malapportionment in the 
electoral system. This bias refers to those situations in which there are a mismatch 
between the share of legislative seats and the shares of population in a given district or 
region. When malapportionment is present, the payoffs in terms of representation are 
altered depending on the region, so politicians will try to take advantage of it. “In 
malapportioned systems, executives may thus face powerful incentives to build policy 
coalitions based on the ‘cheap’ support (for example, in terms of pork per vote) of 
legislators from overrepresented districts.” (Samuels and Snyder, 2001: 667). Therefore, 
                                                            
2 It is important to remind that depending on the author it holds under any circumstance (Cox and 
McCubbins, 1987) or it can be balanced by other elements such as partisan orientation (Dahlberg and 
Johansson, 2002)  
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there are good reasons for expecting investment and transfers to over-represented 
districts. 
This hypothesis has been addressed in different studies. Porto and Sanguinetti 
(2001) analyzed the effect of districts’ over-representation in Argentina’s Congress in 
intergovernmental transfers. They showed that the federal government has tended to 
allocate important and continuing investments in those districts overrepresented in the 
Senate and the Chamber of Deputies over time. Similar studies have addressed this 
hypothesis considering the potential impact of the partisanship variable (Gibson et al., 
1999) but did not introduce changes concerning the main argument: the assemblies’ 
apportionment determines the strategic use of investment and transfers. Evidence has 
supported this argument in other contexts. Hoover and Pecorino (2005) analyzed the 
impact of disproportional representation in federal expenditures in the United States. 
Rodden (2002) followed a similar logic in the study of EU redistribution among 
countries and Pitlik at al. (2006) found that malapportionment in the upper house in 
Germany leads to disproportional states share of per capita transfers among länder.  
However, this explanation fails to point out the mechanisms driving strategic 
allocation in those countries where the apportionment of the legislature is perfect. Does 
the incumbent strategic allocation argument no longer hold? The literature has offered 
two competing theoretical arguments. 
The first model is based on the theoretical background presented by Cox and 
McCubbins (1986). They divide voters into three different groups: support voters, 
opposition voters and swing voters. According to their conception, electoral politics is 
viewed as a two person game in which candidates’ attitude towards risk is the crucial 
factor driving the stability of redistributive politics. The authors apply the same logic as 
in an investment. They argue that risk-averse candidates will prefer to invest resources 
especially in core supporters because they expect a clear return in terms of electoral 
support. On the contrary, candidates’ expectation of electoral support is lower among 
swing voters and even lower among opposition groups, so they will allocate little 
investment in those groups. This strategy is based on the mobilization of the core voters 
of a party and has been labeled as “Hold what you got” or “Take care of your own” 
(Cox and McCubbins, 1986: 383). 
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The second model is based on the papers by Lindbeck and Weibull (1993) and 
Dixit and Londregan (1996, 1998). It assumes that voters cast their ballots considering 
their ideological preferences and the consumption level promised by parties. According 
to that, authors distinguished between core voters, with strongly party attachment, and 
swing voters, indifferent between the parties on policy positions and more likely to 
switch their votes on the basis of particularistic benefits. Given the different preferences 
between the two groups, they suggest that incumbents will invest resources in districts 
until reaching the specific point in which swing voters decide to vote for them. Under 
some assumptions about the distribution of voters’ preferences3, this optimal point will 
be correlated with the closeness of last election (Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002). Then, 
swing states will be the primary target of strategic resource allocation; in those districts 
where there is higher competitiveness in an electoral contest, the marginal utility of 
public investment is also higher. Recent evidence has been centered on Swedish 
intergovernmental transfer programs to municipalities (Johansson, 2003; Dahlberg and 
Johansson, 2002) and has proven the robustness of the hypothesis4. 
The study by Boex and Martinez-Vázquez (2005) distinguished several 
explanatory models in order to establish the institutional mechanism of grant allocation. 
However, they considered different case studies together and found a high consistency 
in the role played by political factors driving it. In that which concerns the political 
allocation of resources, they stressed the voter choice model; the allocation of 
intergovernmental grants will be distributed to local governments in accordance with 
the fiscal preferences of the median voter. On the other hand, they also underline the 
important literature centered on institutional elements, especially regarding the 
hypothesis that “subnational government with powerful political interests can be 
expected to receive larger intergovernmental grants” (Boex and Martinez-Vázquez, 
2005: 7). In a similar way, Veiga and Pinho (2005) showed that specific local 
considerations matters. They proved that the longer the time span of the mayor in office, 
the more funds are transferred to his/her municipality. They also introduce the relevance 
of political timing, pointing out that grants increase in election years.  
                                                            
3 The assumption are symmetry and a single-peakedness distribution. 
4 Studies dealing with this hypothesis have been centered on those programs fulfilling some conditions: 
Intergovernmental grants have to be dependent on the incumbent decision, the investment should be 
disentangled form efficiency and equity criteria, resources can be easily connected to an election and 
voters can identify if they have (not) been rewarded. (Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002: 27) 
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Therefore, interaction between central and subnational has also been pointed out 
as a crucial variable. Literature has suggested that intergovernmental transfers can be 
directly related to the incentives that an “opportunistic center” has to guarantee that his 
party controls the state government. Khemani (2003) studied the case of Indian 
federalism and she argued that state governments are key bases in order to secure the 
incumbent party support at the national election; states can use instruments such as 
patronage in order to boost incumbents´ political support. Consequently “National 
governments have political incentives to ensure that their party controls state 
governments, for which purpose it attempts to bias the distribution of national resources 
to political affiliated states” (Khemani, 2003: 9). This argument has been proven when 
Khemani shows that states in India belonging to the same party have higher deficits, 
entirely financed by loans and transfers from the central government. In posterior 
research about India, Khemani (2007) proved that intergovernmental transfers are 
targeted to a particular type of partisan states. In specific, she pointed out that “transfers 
determined by the political agency are greater to those co-partisan states where the party 
controls a smaller proportion of districts or seats allotted to the state in the national 
legislature” (Khemani, 2007: 466).  
Despite the fact that all these factors may affect strategic resource allocation of 
national incumbents, little effort has been made in order to integrate them together in 
the same explanatory model. In order to do so, the Spanish case offers a perfect case 
study to test the strategic allocation of investments and intergovernmental grants for 
different reasons. The Spanish Constitution allowed a decentralization of the country 
which led to the creation of 17 Autonomous Communities (ACs). Due to historical and 
political reasons, two opposite financing systems emerged. Two ACs (the Basque 
country and Navarre), collect all taxes in their territories and transfer a part to the 
central state depending on its service provision. On the contrary, grants (both 
unconditional and conditional) and, to a lesser extent, tax sharing, have been, by and 
large, the main source of revenues for the remaining 15 ACs. Then, agreements on those 
instruments involve periodical renegotiation and opening up the possibility of rent-
seeking (Lago-Peñas, 2005: 442).  
There is a second reason to use Spain as a case study. A number of papers have 
been centered on how the electoral system can shape incentives towards public 
spending, the size of the government or the levels of redistribution (Persson and 
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Tabellini, 2003; Boex and Martínez-Vazquez, 2005; Iversen and Soskice, 2006). By far, 
district magnitude has been considered the main element that shapes the electoral 
revenue that incumbents can obtain when they allocate resources, so the flow of 
intergovernmental transfers can be affected by those countries in which district 
magnitude is not a constant across constituencies. This is the case of Spain, a country 
with important variance in district magnitude across constituencies in national elections 
(Monroe and Rose, 2002). This within-country difference is relevant to the extent that 
the marginal utility of intergovernmental transfers is higher in those regions in which a 
higher number of national seats are allocated when the “take care of their own” strategy 
is the preferred one. Thus, this hypothesis can only be tested in countries in which there 
is important variance in district magnitude in the national electoral system like the case 
of Spain. 
Finally, the case of Spain is puzzling and the research dealing with the 
Autonomous Communities is scarce in general. In Lago-Peñas (2005) this topic is 
partially addressed in the discussion of regional debt bailout. Some evidence suggests 
that political affinity helps to explain the size of per capita investment agreements in 
those regions under the common financing system during the period between 1992-1996 
and the relative gains in the financing system in 1991 (not in 1986). Nevertheless, those 
results should be considered with caution5. In the case of investment agreements, 
Jarocinska (2006) discarded the relevance of political variables on its distribution over 
the period 1986-1996. However, in the case of direct transfers of the central state 
managed by the Autonomous Communities, she found that political affinity between 
regional and national government does not involve more per capita resources. 
Nevertheless, it affects voters’ loyalty because the percentage of “swing voters” is a 
relevant explanatory factor.  
 
Leon-Alfonso (2007) provides evidence about the relevance of swing voters and 
partisan affinity. Her main contribution is centered on pointing out how the relative 
importance of both components changes with the institutional design. The lower the 
decentralization is, the more important the role played by partisan affinity and the less 
                                                            
5 In short, the coefficients are statistically significant at a 10% level, the sample discards temporal-series 
analysis because it uses averages calculated between 1986-1996, and, fundamentally, the political affinity 
variable is roughly measured. It is considered that an autonomous community has political affinity if, 
during the period 1986-1996, most of time the party in office has been the same as the national incumbent 
PSOE. 
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important the role played by swing voters. Gomez-Reino and Herrero (2011) change the 
scope and center their interest on explaining the annual evolution of the several grant 
programs to regions. Despite analyzing different political factors such as the affinity in 
the party ruling at the two levels, electoral margins, legislative agreements of single-
minority governments at the national level with subnational parties or the incumbent 
electoral support in ACs, none of them proved to be statistically significant. Our 
contribution is threefold. First, the gains in ordinary and regulated resources in reform 
moments are analyzed. Second, we estimate more complete specifications including 
political and economic mechanisms. Third, we encompass arguments dealing with the 
strategic use of intergovernmental transfers in order to shed new light on the puzzling 
case of Spain.  
  
 
3. VARIABLES, DATA, SPECIFICATIONS, AND ECONOMETRIC METHODS 
 
 In order to test the systematic influence of the previously mentioned variables on 
the Autonomous Communities´ resource distribution, we focus on those processes and 
instruments in which their influence should be strongest. First, we analyze the relative 
gains involved by periodical bargaining and reforms of the financing of regions, 
excluding the particular cases of the Basque Country and Navarre. We have set aside 
the analysis of intra-period variation because granted revenues are mostly driven by 
exogenous and common cross-region growth rates6. Second, we pay attention to the 
most discretional program of earmarked grants from central administration to regional 
governments, the so called “investment agreements”.  
 
 Therefore, two different endogenous variables will be analyzed. First is the gains 
(GAIN) obtained by each one of the 15 Autonomous Communities under the common 
regional financing system7 on the bargaining of the successive systems for the periods 
                                                            
6 All in all, we recognize that over the analyzed period the central government was constantly devolving 
expenditure powers to the ACs, including health care and education. This devolution takes place within a 
bilateral commission in which a political negotiation determines the cost of sustaining public services at 
the pre-devolution level. Then, the central government commits to transfer an amount of resources equal 
to that cost of maintenance. Of course, within this political negotiation, some regional gains could take 
place, by overestimating the cost of providing services. 
7 The Basque Country and Navarre have their own financing system, bilaterally negotiated between the 
central government and each of the regions.  
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1986-1991, 1992-1996, 2002-2008, and 2009-20138. It is computed as the variation in 
revenues provided by the regional financing system due to the reform: 
100itit
it
REVENUESGAIN
REVENUES OLD SYSTEM
Δ= ⋅ , where subindex i= 1,…,15 indicates region 
and t = 1,…,4 indicates reform. Second, the so-called “investment agreements”; 
earmarked grants distributed on a project basis (GRANTS) to all 17 Spanish 
Autonomous Communities over the period 1986-2001. As clarified above, these 
agreements are the grants category that can be more discretionally assigned by the 
central government. This variable is expressed in Euros per capita.  
 
The explanatory variables considered are the following: 
 
1. The first set of political variables tries to capture the extent to which the 
national incumbent is centered on “taking care of your own” (Cox and 
McCubbins, 1986). The variable NATIONAL ELECTION measures the vote 
share obtained by the party in national government in each autonomous 
community. Despite there being four nationwide parties and different 
subnational parties in the Congress9, during the studied period only single party 
governments have been formed by PSOE (center-left) and PP (center-right) 
parties at the national level. This variable takes into account national electoral 
cycle (PSOE until 1996; PP 1996-2004 and PSOE since then). If it is confirmed 
that national governments allocate more intergovernmental transfers in those 
communities where they do better, the optimal allocation threshold should be 
greater in those regions where there are a higher marginal utility, that is, in those 
where more seats are allocated. Therefore, if national votes prove to be 
statistically significant, we will test the interaction of vote shares of national 
incumbents (NATIONAL ELECTION) and the percentage of seats of the lower 
chamber “Congreso de los Diputados” allocated in each Autonomous 
Community (DISTRICT MAGNITUDE).  
 
                                                            
8 In the reform for the period 1997-2001 there were no increases in resources transferred to regions. 
9 Spanish party system during almost all studied period have been formed by two-and-a-half national 
parties (PSOE, PP, IU/PCE) and different subnational parties addressing the representation of national 
minorities, especially those from Catalonia (CiU) and Basque Country (PNV).  
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On the other hand, the REGIONAL ELECTION variable measures the vote share 
of the national party in regional elections. For both NATIONAL ELECTION and 
REGIONAL ELECTION variables, lagged values are used in order to capture the 
idea that the national incumbent will reward those districts where it received 
more votes in previous election10. For the both of the same variables the 
expected coefficient is positive; the national incumbent will allocate more 
transfers where he has received more votes.  
There are no relevant differences between the national and the regional electoral 
system. On the one hand, the Congress of Deputies is composed of 350 
members directly elected for a four-year term of office. The constituency is 
each one of the 50 provinces with a minimum of two seats allocated. Ceuta and 
Melilla elect one member. The remaining 248 seats are allocated among the 
fifty provinces in proportion to their populations. Electors cast a ballot for a 
single list and the seats in each constituency are apportioned according to the 
D´Hondt method (Proportional Representation). On the other hand, the size of 
regional parliaments is proportional to the population of the Community, 
despite that in 13 of them the district is the province, in Asturias, Murcia and 
Canary and Balearic Island the constituency is below this territorial level (Lago, 
2004). All the autonomous electoral systems have adopted, in tune with the 
Chamber of Deputies electoral system, the D’Hondt formula. In our analysis, 
Autonomous Community will be taken as the basic territorial unit.  
Third, we introduce in the specification political affinity (AFFINITY) between 
national and subnational incumbents (Khemani, 2003, 2007)11.  This variable is 
defined in a different way in specifications [1] and [2] presented below. In 
specification [1] the variable is coded 1 if there is the same party in national and 
subnational government when the agreement is signed and 0 otherwise. In the 
case of investment agreements we adopt more severe criteria. Variable is coded 
1 when the same parties are in both governments during both the passing and 
execution phases of the budgetary process. Additionally, we test if the political 
                                                            
10 We have introduced the lagged variable in order to avoid endogeneity problems. The central argument 
is that those districts where the national incumbent gets better electoral results will be rewarded with 
more intergovernmental transfers in the next period.  
11 In the case of coalition governments at the regional level, we consider that there are political affinities 
if at least one of its members has the same political colour as the national incumbent.  
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affinity effect is stronger in electoral years (Veiga and Pinho, 2005).We have 
defined an ELECTORAL YEAR variable, which has value 1 in those years where 
national elections are held and 0 otherwise12. In the econometric specification 
we include the interaction of political affinity (AFFINITY) and electoral year 
(ELECTORAL YEAR) as well as the constitutive terms of the interaction in order 
to avoid biases in the coefficients (Brambor et al, 2006)13. 
  
2. The second set of variables is centered on the extent to which national 
incumbents devote their investment efforts in those regions where there are more 
swing voters (Lindbeck y Weibull, 1993; Dixit y Londregan, 1996, 1998; 
Dahlberg y Johansson, 2002). We have measured regions as swing depending on 
the electoral competitiveness according to Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) and 
using the raw margin of votes between the first and the second party (v1-v2) 
(Söderlund et al., 2011). The NATIONAL DISTANCE (REGIONAL DISTANCE) 
variable measures the vote share difference between first and second party at the 
national (regional) level in each region. The higher both variables is the less 
competitive is the election in this region and, as a consequence, lower 
intergovernmental transfers and gains of financing system is expected.  
 
3. The last set of political variables focuses on the electoral gain of territories 
receiving transfers. Figure 1 shows the expected strong correlation between 
population and seats allocated shares. However, this relationship is not exactly 
proportional. Less populated regions tend to be over-represented in the 
Parliament. This fact is graphically represented by a regression line with a slope 
below the unity (0.86). On the one hand, more populated territories are more 
relevant in order to secure the national incumbent re-election. But on the other, 
according to the logic of strategic investment in case of malapportionment, more 
per capita resources in small territories should be allocated because the vote/seat 
ratio tend to increase with population size. Therefore, we have introduced two 
                                                            
12We can include both this variable and individual fixed-effect thanks to the existence of asymmetries in 
electoral cycles in the different Autonomous Communities. On the contrary, we have to set aside those 
variables in the case of the equation for GAIN due to the low between-variation across regions. We also 
tried to define the variable in alternative ways, coding 1 in pre-electoral years and 0 otherwise; and also 
coding 1 in both electoral and pre-electoral years, and 0 otherwise.  Results did not significantly change 
13 In the case of the interaction between NATIONAL ELECTION and DISTRICT MAGNITUDE, the latter 
is not included as independent regressor because its within-variation is close o zero and then 
multicollinearity with individual fixed-effects was extremely high.   
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extra variables in the specifications. The variable POPULATION is defined as 
the population share of each autonomous community. Ceuta and Melilla have 
been excluded because they are outliers in their relation seats/ population. The 
second variable, SEATS, is the ratio between seats and total population 
(expressed in millions of inhabitants) for each region. Ceuta and Melilla have 
been excluded again. 
 
4. We also explored the relevance of economic variables to explain both 
endogenous variables. Preliminary estimates included up to three variables: per 
capita GDP, unemployment rate, and percentage of population over 65. 
However, those variables were scarcely significant, with t-statistics below 1. 
Consequently, they were dropped from econometric specifications. 
 
5. Finally, the debt stock of regional governments (DEBT) is included as 
regressor. This inclusion is justified by the literature on bailouts to regional 
governments14. Its core idea is that subcentral governments expecting to be 
bailed out from financial problems by the central government will opt to carry 
larger deficits and hence larger debt stocks. A positive and statistically 
significant coefficient would mean that there are implicit bailouts to those 
regional governments with more debt. The variable is expressed in thousands of 
Euros per capita. We have taken the value at the end of the previous year to the 
implementation of financing system reforms or investment agreements. 
 
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
 
 
 Data sources are the following: Population data have been obtained from the 
National Statistics Institute of Spain (http://www.ine.es). Data on investment 
                                                            
14 In Lago-Peñas (2005) this literature on bailouts of regional governments is surveyed. In this paper, the 
determinants of regional deficits and bailout expectations are also analyzed, using data for Spain over the 
period 1984-1999. 
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agreements are taken from BADESPE (http://www.ief.es). Data is available for the 
period 1986-2001. To measure the regional gains involved by bargaining on the 
financing system we rely upon the estimates by Utrilla (2002) for the reforms driving 
the periods 1987-1991, 1992-1996 and 2002-2008 and by Bosch (2011) for the period 
starting in 2009. Electoral and political data are gathered from the official website of the 
Home Ministry (http://www.interior.gob.es/) and the several sites from this website 
devoted to national and regional elections.  
 
Econometric Specifications and methodology 
 
The following three econometric specifications are estimated:  
 
1 1 2
3 4 5 1
it i t it it
it it it it
GAIN NATIONALELECTION AFFINITY
REGIONALDISTANCE NATIONAL DISTANCE DEBT
α λ β β
β β β ε
−
−
= + + ⋅ + ⋅ +
⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +   [1] 
 
1 1
2 1
3 1 4 5
6 7
8
it i t it
it it
it it it
it it it
G NATIONAL ELECTION
NATIONAL ELECTION DISTRICT MAGNITUDE
REGIONAL ELECTION AFFINITY ELECTORALYEAR
ELECTORALYEAR AFFINITY REGIONAL DISTANCE
NATION
α λ β
β
β β β
β β
β
−
−
−
= + + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ ⋅ +
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ 9 1it it itAL DISTANCE DEBTβ ε−+ ⋅ +
 [2] 
 
1 1i i i itFixed Effects POPULATION SEATSα γ γ μ= + ⋅ + ⋅ +      [3] 
 
In all cases, subindex i and t indicate region and year, respectively, and ε is a 
white-noise random error. As stated above, data for Navarre and the Basque Country are 
set aside for estimating specification [1]. Moreover, some variables are dropped from 
this specification due to several reasons related with the short time span of the sample. 
Insofar as between-variation of ELECTORAL YEAR is very low for the four analyzed 
years, multicollinearity with time-effects was very high. Correlation between 
NATIONAL ELECTION and REGIONAL ELECTION was troublesome in this case and 
the former was excluded. 
 
 For the endogenous variable GAIN, four cross-sections are merged, yielding 60 
observations (15*4). Insofar as both time and cross-section dimensions of the sample 
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are small, the use of specific panel data or time-series cross-section (TSCS) econometric 
techniques is discarded. On the contrary, we rely on OLS estimators, replacing standard 
residuals by general-form heteroskedasticty robust errors. Finally, according to the 
Breusch-Godfrey autocorrelation test, there are no problems in this respect. All the 
estimates are performed using the software Eviews 7.2. This specification is centered on 
the impact of political affinity and debt stocks on the gains in negotiations, where short-
term electoral considerations are more difficult to be taken into account.   
 
In the case of specification [2] the first step is the analysis of the data generator 
process of variable investment agreements (GRANTS). Hence several unit root tests 
were performed. One of the tests assumes the existence of common unit roots (Levin. 
Lin y Chu). The rest of them assume the existence of idiosyncratic unit roots (Im, 
Pesaran y Shin, Fisher-PP, Fisher-ADF). In all cases, intercepts and time trends were 
included to avoid specification biases. The results are straightforward: Variable 
GRANTS is I(0) or stationary, and p-values were well below 0.01. The straight 
consequence of this result is that the specification is formulated with the variables 
expressed in levels. In order to deal with both heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous 
correlations in the random error, OLS standard errors are replaced by Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors (PCSE). Concerning autocorrelation, the first order coefficient was very 
low, around 0.2 and hence not troublesome.  
 
Both time and individual fixed-effect are included in the specifications [1] and 
[2]. While time fixed-effects accounts for common shocks, individual effects control for 
the existence of systematic biases in the allocation of resources to the different 
regions15. The extremely low within-variation of both POPULATION and SEATS led to 
a serious multicollinearity problem with individual fixed-effects. For this reason, 
instead of including both variables in the original regression, estimated individual fixed 
effects in column (1) of both Tables 3 and 4 are regressed on both variables in 
specification [3] to check if they are relevant to explain the systematic differences 
across regions in the amount of perceived grants.  
 
4. RESULTS 
                                                            
15Performed formal tests backed up the need of introducing both sorts of fixed-effects. 
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Tables 1 and 2 report the main descriptive statistics for the variables in 
specifications. 
 
 
  [INSERT TABLE 1 AND TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
 
Table 3 summarizes the estimates of specification [1]. In the first column none 
of the variables are statistically significant at the standard levels despite variable DEBT 
being marginally significant. In order to analyze in more detail the effect of this 
variable, it is interacted with a set of four dummy variables (T1 to T4) to check for 
changes in the effect of this variable over time16. The results provide interesting 
evidence. During the eighties, when debt stocks were low, this variable does not matter 
at all. This situation changes in the ´90s. The variable is marginally significant. In the 
next decade the effect is statistically significant at a 10% level or lower. What is most 
surprising is the change in the coefficient sign between the third and fourth reforms. In 
terms of Spanish GDP, regional public debt was almost the same at the time of both 
reforms, but the coefficient is negative in the first case and positive in the second17. 
Why is it that in one period the higher the debt of the autonomous community, the 
higher the gains received, while in the second period the opposite is true?  
 
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
 
First, reforms of federal financial relationships are based on multilateral 
bargaining between the central government and autonomous communities. 
Nevertheless, the demographic and electoral importance of Catalonia and its strong 
preference in favor of decentralization made this region the main agent in negotiations. 
                                                            
16 Variable T1 is coded 1 for observations corresponding to the first reform (1987) and 0 otherwise. The 
same procedure is followed for the other three reforms in 1992 (T2), 2002 (T3) and 2009 (T4). 
17 Linear simple correlation between both variables for the reform in 2002 is -0.41 
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The financial system reforms have depended to a higher extent on the parliamentary 
majorities in the Congress and the extent to which Catalan nationalist parties were 
decisive in the support of the national incumbent (Leon-Alfonso, 2008: 218). This 
factor was important in 2009 negotiations. The national government was a single 
majority party in parliament and it depended on the support of Catalan parties´ MPs. 
Therefore, the central government was a much weaker player during this period 
compared with absolute majority periods18. While it is true that the 1996 agreements took 
place under the same circumstances, regional governments in 2009 were stronger political 
actors than in 1996, because of the decentralization process itself. The share of regional 
governments in total public sending in Spain increased from 23% to 36% over this 
period (Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2011).  
 
Second, until 2001 those Autonomous Communities with more debt were the 
ones with higher levels of decentralization and powers, especially those with higher per 
capita GDP: the less developed (Galicia and Andalusia) enjoyed higher per capita 
budgets thanks to grants from both Spanish and European regional policy (Lago-Peñas, 
2005 and 2006). The 2001 financing reform was in the middle of an expansive cycle 
and the problems related with the management of deficits, debt and fiscal consolidation 
were not a priority. The core of this reform was centered on the transference of health 
care systems in 10 AC which, as was said, were the ones with lower debt stocks (Ruiz-
Huerta and Herrero, 2004). The health care system was, in fact, the main element 
driving the reform. “Health care financing is one of the main difficulties in the 
negotiation of the new model (…) This competence will involve important amounts of 
spending, so Autonomous Communities are demanding that the national government 
provide guarantees enough that health care administration will not be a total disaster. 
The central government is in conditions of creating a fund with extra help to cover 
unplanned spending”19. 
 
Nevertheless, in 2009 fiscal consolidation, debt and deficits were the key 
concerns. For example, the regional minister of finances from Catalonia argued that the 
economic crisis will reduce revenues and will create deficit. Nevertheless: “the 
[financing] system reform was necessary because it is structural, permanent, a new 
                                                            
18 PSOE enjoyed absolute majority in Parliament 1982-1993 and Popular Party 2000-2004. 
19 Newspaper “La Vanguardia”. Friday, June 1 2001. p.19.  
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model affecting our income structure.  It is a qualitative change. A different thing is the 
economic crisis. Even with a better model we still have deficits because it happens 
everywhere, even to better financed states”. However the regional minister posited that: 
“The entry of 2,150 million of Euros in 2009 thanks to the new financing model will 
allow us to have fewer deficits than what we would have had with the previous one”20.  
The fact that those Autonomous Communities with more debt had lower per capita 
financing allowed a relative improvement (Bosch, 2011). 
Definitively, the mechanism linking debt with higher transfers does not seem to 
operate automatically and in a universal sense. It depends on the relative importance of 
subnational entities’ debt, the relative power of the central government and regions in 
debt and the problems or challenges addressed as priorities in each discussion about the 
allocation of funds. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Estimates of specification [2] are reported in columns 1 and 2 of table 4. In 
column 3 the individual fixed-effects estimated in the first column are regressed again 
on variables with extremely low within-variation. In column 1 variables with statistical 
significance lower than 10% are NATIONAL ELECTION, ELECTORAL YEAR, and 
REGIONAL DISTANCE. Estimated signs are the expected except in the case of the 
second one. A negative coefficient of ELECTORAL YEAR points out that regional 
elections negatively affect the implementation of agreements, contrary to Veiga and 
Pinho’s (2005) hypothesis. Finally, insofar as the interaction between AFFINITY and 
ELECTORAL YEAR is not significant, there is no evidence supporting the idea of 
special investment efforts in electoral year in those communities with the same parties 
in national and regional governments.  
 
The variable measuring the electoral distance between the first and the second 
party at the regional level (REGIONAL DISTANCE) gives evidence in favor of the 
strategic investment of national governments in contested regions. The higher the 
electoral distance between the principal parties of the regional election (less competitive 
                                                            
20 Newspaper “La Vanguardia”. Sunday, August 9 2009. pp-59-60. 
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election), the lower the investment in investment agreements is. The electoral result of 
the incumbent at the regional elections (REGIONAL ELECTION) is not statistically 
significant. 
 
On the contrary, the electoral distance of the two main parties at the national 
level in a given region (NATIONAL DISTANCE) does not affect investment agreements, 
but the vote share of the party at the national level in the previous election (NATIONAL 
ELECTION) does21. Therefore, at the national level the preferred strategy is to “take 
care of your own”. When this variable interacts with district magnitude in the model 
(NATIONAL ELECTION * DISTRICT MAGNITUDE) it presents a positive and 
statistically significant result (column 2 of Table 4). This means that national 
incumbents do not “take care of their own” to the same extent in all regions but it is 
strategically determined by the potential seat gains of each region. The levels of 
investment will be higher in those regions where the national incumbents have more 
electoral support in previous election and have more seats at stake.  
This evidence points out that hypotheses about the strategic use of investment 
agreements are complementary; one or the other will be preferred depending on the kind 
of election. There exist different optimal investment thresholds depending on the 
electoral contest. In the case of regional elections the optimal level of provision depends 
on the strategy of maximizing the possibilities of changing a swing region irrespective 
of the levels of support the national incumbent has. Nevertheless, in national elections 
the aim is different because the potential threshold of investment is higher. The 
challenge is not to change swing regions (which do not affect the final result because 
national constituencies are provinces) but rather to mobilize the national incumbent 
strongholds as much as possible, especially those regions where more seats are 
allocated.  
The argument of strategic use of intergovernmental transfers is similar to the one 
by Khemani (2007) when she says that, among co-partisan states, the ones in which it is 
preferred to invest are those with a lower proportion of seats controlled by the national 
incumbent. There is a kind of swing state among those owned by the party. However, 
                                                            
21 Insofar as variables REGIONAL ELECTION and NATIONAL ELECTION are correlated (r=0.8), this 
result could be explained by multicollinearity. However, the first variable was not significant when the 
second one was dropped either. The interaction between REGIONAL ELECTION and DISTRICT 
MAGNITUDE was neither significant at 10% level nor lower. 
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the explanation of our interaction is partially different because in Spain there is an 
importance variance in district magnitude (Monroe and Rose, 2002). Therefore, the 
expected utility of investment will vary depending on the number of seats allocated. If a 
“take care of your own” strategy is assumed, the expected electoral revenue will be 
higher, relative to the more seats that Autonomous Community has. This explains the 
positive sign of the interactive effect. 
Finally, POPULATION and SEATS are not statistically significant in column 3 
of both Tables 3 and 4. In the case of the second one the explanation can be related to 
the misadjustment between the Autonomous Communities and the district in national 
elections, the province. The SEATS variable considers the share of MPs per capita of the 
Autonomous Community. However, marginal seats linked with competitiveness (Blais 
and Lago, 2009) and malapportionment (Samuels and Snyder, 2001) should be 
calculated at the provincial level. Therefore, it is possible that its insignificant effect is 
driven by this problem, impossible to be solved with available data22. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Political officials in evolving federations may be tempted to use 
intergovernmental transfers and grants with strategic purposes. However, there is still an 
important lack of understanding on the institutional settings driving that behavior and 
the preferred tactic. In this paper we have addressed two different policies related with 
territorial resource allocation from the center: the gains of the Spanish regions or 
Autonomous Communities in the periodical negotiations of their financing system and 
the most discretional earmarked grants made by the central government to regional 
governments. This paper tests whether political variables related with electoral contests 
and their interaction are relevant in explaining their relative assignment across 
territories. We have shown that gains in the system of financing are unrelated to 
strategic use. The main factor driving those gains is regional public debt stocks. All in 
                                                            
22 It can be argued that the share of seats by Autonomous Community can distort the results if there are 
important differences in district magnitude within regions. All in all, the only region where internal 
variation is really relevant is Catalonia (standard deviation of 12.8 seats compared with the mean of 1.86). 
Econometric results did not change when Catalonia was dropped to estimate specification [3]. 
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all the sign and magnitude of its effect depends on more factors, in particular the 
specific issues discussed in the inter-territorial negotiation.  
 
However, the situation is quite different in the case of intergovernmental 
transfers. Our argument is that two crucial elements will drive the preferred strategy in 
terms of their allocation: the arena of competition and the expected marginal gain. In 
regional contests, the national incumbents tend to allocate intergovernmental transfers 
in order to break a tie in elections and gain the subnational government. Nevertheless, 
the strategy is different in the case of national elections. In this case, the incumbent will 
prefer to distribute more money in those regions where it performs better in order to 
mobilize their voters, especially in those regions in which there are more seats to be 
won. Then, both strategies are followed simultaneously by a center interested in 
maximizing its chances in national elections and securing as many subnational 
governments as possible. 
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Figure 1: Relationship between population and seats shares. 
 Aggregated data for regions in 1996  
 
 
Sources: INE (www.ine.es), Ministerio del Interior (http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/min/) and own 
elaboration.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables in Equation [1]. Stacked data 
  Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation 
Observations Number of 
cross 
sections 
GAIN 7.27 6.40 32.10 0.80 5.33 60 15 
NATIONAL 
ELECTION 
44.89 44.05 60.70 22.80 7.78 60 15 
AFFINITY  0.62 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.49 60 15 
DEBT 0.53 0.40 2.43 0.00 0.55 60 15 
REGIONAL 
DISTANCE 
13.34 13.32 29.79 0.15 7.06 60 15 
 NATIONAL 
DISTANCE 
12.72 10.75 34.40 0.20 8.92 60 15 
POPULATION  0.06 0.04 0.18 0.0066 0.053 60 15 
SEATS 9.10 8.80 13.31 5.75 1.87 60 15 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables in equation [2]. Stacked data 
  Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation 
Number of 
Observations 
Number of 
cross 
sections 
GAIN 14.24 10.16 131.85 0.006 14.86 272 17 
NATIONAL ELECTION 41.39 40.80 58.10 18.00 8.93 272 17 
REGIONAL ELECTION 38.44 39.46 54.28 9.51 10.11 272 17 
AFFINITY 0.51 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 272 17 
ELECTORAL YEAR 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.44 272 17 
ELECTORAL YEAR * 
AFFINITY 
0.099 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.30 272 17 
REGIONAL DISTANCE 12.45 12.01 32.73 0.150 7.574 272 17 
 NATIONAL DISTANCE 10.60 9.20 34.40 0.20 8.11 272 17 
DEBT 0.39 0.33 1.62 0.000 0.37 272 17 
POPULATION  0.058 0.040 0.18 0.006 0.049 272 17 
SEATS 9.58 9.15 15.38 6.32 2.08 272 17 
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Table 3: Econometric estimates of equation [1] and [3] 
Equation 
 
[1] [1] [3] 
Intercept 3.03 
(0.40) 
5.87 
(3.87) 
3.20 
(0.92) 
NATIONAL 
ELECTION-1 
0.00           
(0.00) 
 
 
AFFINITY  0.28 
(0.15) 
 
 
REGIONAL 
DISTANCE 
0.18 
(0.85) 
 
 
NATIONAL 
DISTANCE 
-0.04 
(0.22) 
 
 
DEBT-1 4.01 
(1.55) 
 
 
DEBT-1 *T1 
 
12.48 
(0.33) 
 
DEBT-1 *T2 
 
10.80 
(1.43) 
 
DEBT-1 *T3 
 
-4.09* 
(1.68) 
 
DEBT-1 *T4 
 
5.29** 
(2.16) 
 
POPULATION  
 
 -20.28 
(1.55) 
SEATS 
 
 -0.21 
(0.66) 
Number of 
observations 
60 60 15 
F-Statistic 
(p-value) 
  0.34 
R2 0.511 0.557 0.166 
Notes: Estimates in column 1 and 2 include both individual and time fixed-effects. Computed t-statistics in columns 
[1] and [2] are robust to general form heteroskedasticity. *, ** means statistical significance at 10%, 5% level. 
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Table 4: Econometric estimates of equations [2] and [3] 
Equation 
 
[2] [2] [3] 
Intercept 9.29 
(1.52) 
16.9** 
(2.23) 
-8.05 
(0.88) 
NATIONAL ELECTION-1 0.40* 
(1.94) 
-0.10 
(0.31) 
 
NATIONAL ELECTION-1*DISTRICT MAGNITUDE  0.05** 
(2.24) 
 
REGIONAL ELECTION-1 -0.18 
(1.14) 
-0.20 
(1.27) 
 
AFFINITY 3.08 
(1.06) 
3.76 
(1.25) 
 
ELECTORAL YEAR -3.58* 
(1.84) 
-3.18* 
(1.63) 
 
ELECTORAL YEAR* AFFINITY 1.26 
(0.35) 
0.59 
(0.16) 
 
REGIONAL DISTANCE -0.29** 
(2.24) 
-0.27** 
(2.09) 
 
NATIONAL DISTANCE -0.08 
(0.58) 
-0.10 
(0.32) 
 
DEBT-1 -0.002 
(0.39) 
-0.001 
(0.22) 
 
POPULATION    9.450 
(0.28) 
SEATS   0.8 
(0.95) 
Number of observations 
272 
(17*16) 
272 
(17*16) 
17 
R2 0.476 0.484 0.06 
Notes: Estimates in columns 1 and 2 include both time and individual fixed-effects and rely on PCSE proposed by  
Beck and Katz (1995) to compute t-statistics. *, **, *** means statistical sighnificance at 10%, 5% y 1% levels, 
respectively. 
